Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs

1998

State of Utah v. Brien Larson Hoffhine : Reply Brief
Utah Court of Appeals

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Joanne C. Slotnik; Assistant Attorney General; Counsel for Appellee.
Kevin J. Kurumada; Counsel for Appellant.
Recommended Citation
Reply Brief, Utah v. Hoffhine, No. 981827 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1998).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2/1928

This Reply Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of Appeals
Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

COPY
IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT

STATE OF UTAH,
CASE NO. 981^827-SC
PLAINTIFF/APPELLEE,
PRIORITY NO. 2
(INCARCERATED)
BRIEN LARSON HOFFHTNE,
DEFENDANT/APPELLANT.

REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT
THIS IS A DIRECT APPEAL FROM A CONVICTION OF
AGGRAVATED ROBBERY, A FIRST DEGREE FELONY, IN
VIOLATION OF UTAH CODE ANN. §76-6-302, ENTERED IN THE
THIRD DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY,
STATE OF UTAH, THE HONORABLE LESLIE A. LEWIS, JUDGE,
PRESIDING.

JOANNE C. SLOTNIK
ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL
160 EAST 300 SOUTH, 6TH FLOOR
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84114

KEVIN J. KURUMADA
335 SOUTH 300 EAST, SUITE 200
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84111
TELEPHONE: (801)322-1616

COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE

COUNSEL FOR APPEL

ftrto

JUN 2 8 2000
CLERK SUPREME COURT
UTAH

IN THE UTAH SUPREME COLKI

STATE OF UTAH,
CAS] ' ••

-:8^.7-SC

IM AINUFF/APPELLEE,
PRIORITY NO. 2
(INCARCERATED)

v.
« i,-vR.- / . l i U h f - H l
r

WFT-\r.

-.

• v '-"

\PPFI

: ANT.

! HIS is A uiRtL i APPEAL I-ROM A CONVICTION OF
• R WATED ROBBERY. A FIRST DEGREE FELONY. IN
VIOLATION OF UTAH CODE .ANN §76-6-302, ENTERED IN THE
THIRD DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COI 'NTT
STATE OF UTAH THE HONOR.ABLE LESI IE A I EWIS. ;; :i uL,
PRESIDING.

JOANNE C. SLOTNTK
ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL
160 EAST 300 SOUTH, 6TH FLOOR
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84114
(.'( M iNSEL !•(, )K AITt'.Ll. h t

KEVIN J. KURUMADA
335 SOUTH 300 EAST. SUITE 200
SALT LAKE CITY. UTAH 84111

TABLE OF CONTENTS OF BRIEF
ARGUMENTS
I. THE TRIAL COURT'S ERROR IN EXCLUDING THE TERMINOLOGY
"EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATION," BUT ADMITTING FACTS UNDERLYING
THE EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATION, WAS NOT TACTICALLY INVITED BY
TRIAL COUNSEL

1

H. HOFFHINE DID NOT PROVIDE THE JURORS WITH TWO DIFFERENT
VERSIONS OF THE FACTS

4

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
CASES CITED
Parsons v. Barnes, 871 P.2d 516 (Utah), cert, denied 513 U.S. 966 (1994)
State v. Brown, 948 P.2d 337 (Utah 1997)
State v. Bullock, 791 P.2d 155 (Utah), cert denied, 497 U.S. 1024 (1990)
State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201 (Utah 1993)

3
*-4
4
3-4

State v. Nelson, 950 P.2d 940 (Ut. App. 1997)

3

State v. Parsons. 781 P.2d 1275 (Utah 1989)

3

State v. Perdue. 813 P.2d 1201 (Ut. App. 1991)

3

State v. Saunders, 699 P.2d 738 (Utah 1985)

3

State v. Tillman, 750 P.2d 546 (Utah 1987)

3

RULE CITED
Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 24

1

IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT

STATE OF UTAH,
:

CASE NO. 9818827-SC

:

PRIORITY NO. 2

PLAINTIFF/APPELLEE,
v.

(INCARCERATED)

BRIEN LARSON HOFFHINE,
DEFENDANT/APPELLANT.

After carefully reviewing the State's brief and reconsidering his own, counsel for
Hoffhine maintains all factual and legal positions originally set forth in his Opening Brief
of Appellant.
In accordance with rule of appellate procedure 24, in this reply brief, counsel will
not repeat arguments raised in his opening brief, but will address only those matters not
already addressed which refute the State's brief.
ARGUMENTS
I.
THE TRIAL COURT'S ERROR IN
EXCLUDING THE TERMINOLOGY "EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATION,"
BUT ADMITTING FACTS UNDERLYING THE EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATION,
WAS NOT TACTICALLY INVITED BY TRIAL COUNSEL.
The State claims that this Court should not address the merits of the trial court's
ruling excluding the terminology "eyewitness identification, but admitting facts
underlying the eyewitness identification. The State contends that the issue was tactically

waived by trial counsel and that the error, if any, was invited. See State's brief at 1, 1011,12-17.
This Court should reject the State's argument because it misreads the procedural
history of this case and the relevant Utah law.
In claiming that trial counsel waived the issue, the State relies solely on portions of
trial counsel's statements at what the State characterizes as "a clarifying hearing held
after the trial court issued its suppression ruling and before trial began." State's brief at
14.
The hearing quoted by the State actually occurred on the first day of trial, after the
jury was selected, and after the trial court had already ruled that the underlying facts
concerning the identification were admissible. Presumably having selected and prepared
her witnesses, prepared her cross-examinations, prepared her arguments and having
selected her jurors for trial in accordance with the trial court's pre-trial ruling, it was
only at this juncture that trial counsel stated a position consistent with the trial court's
ruling (R. 407 at 143).
A painstaking summary of the procedural history of the issue is accurately set forth
at Point I> Subpoint A of the Opening Brief of Appellant, and demonstrates that the
erroneous legal analysis originated from the trial court, and differed from the correct
position originally asserted by trial counsel. See Opening Brief of Appellant at pp. 13-21.
The States does not distinguish, challenge or mention controlling Utah cases cited
on page 33 of the Opening Brief of Appellant, indicating that once a party has stated his
2

position and the trial court has ruled, the party is not required to except to the ruling of
the trial court or to renew his motions at trial. See Opening Brief of Appellant at 33
(citing State v. Nelson, 950 P.2d 940 (Ut. App. 1997); and State v. Saunders, 699 P.2d
738 (Utah 1985)).
Instead, the State relies on the invited error line of cases, which involve errors
originating with the parties who later attempt to complain of them on appeal. See State's
Brief at 15-17.
The cases involving invited error are factually distinguishable from the instant one,
because the errors in those cases originated from the parties trying to raise the errors as
issues on appeal, and did not originate from the trial courts. See State v. Perdue, 813
P. 2d 1201, 1205 (Ut. App. 1991)(party may not object on appeal to instruction submitted
by that party at trial); State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201,1221 (Utah 1993)(trial counsel's
failing to inform the trial court of the governing law led the trial court into error); State v.
Parsons, 781 P.2d 1275, 1285 (Utah 1989)(prosecutor sought to remove juror as a result
of improper contact between a witness and a juror in capital case, and defense counsel
indicated that the defendant saw no prejudice and did not wish to raise an issue); Parsons
v. Barnes, 871 P.2d 516, 520 (Utah)(defendant could not object to the prosecutor's taking
sworn statements of witnesses, after he had used those statements to his benefit in tne
trial court); State v. Tillman, 750 P.2d 546, 560-61 (Utah 1987)(defendant could not
object to prosecutor's argument, which was rebuttal to defense counsel's argument), cert,
denied 513 U.S. 966 (1994); State v. Brown, 948 P.2d 337, 343 (Utah 1997)(declining to
3

reach issue concerning prosecutor's closing argument, when trial counsel made a strategic
choice not to object); State v. Bullock, 791 P.2d 155,159 (Utah)(defendant may not
strategically choose to abstain from objecting to improper evidence at trial, and then raise
the issue on appeal unless strategy constituted ineffective assistance of counsel), cert.
denied, 497 U.S. 1024 (1990).
The two purposes of the invited error doctrine, permitting trial courts to correct
errors in the first instance, and discouraging parties from leading trial courts into error,
see, e.g., Dunn, supra, would not be served by applying the doctrine here, where trial
counsel framed the issue and stated her position correctly and only followed the trial
court's error once she was in the process of trying the case under the trial court's ruling.

n.
HOFFHINE DID NOT PROVIDE THE JURORS WITH
TWO DIFFERENT VERSIONS OF THE FACTS.
In arguing that the trial court was correct in declining to arrest judgment for
insufficient evidence, the State claims that "the jury had before it two versions of
defendant's whereabouts on the evening of the robbery", identifying the two versions as
the testimony of Mackenzie Carter that Hoffhine was playing Nintendo with her before
he left for the evening with Thomas Powell, and the statements that Hoffhine made to the
police regarding his whereabouts with Thomas Powell on the night of the crime, which
statements to the police did not refer to Mackenzie Carter or to Nintendo. State's brief at
22-23.
In making this argument, the State omits the testimony of its own police officers
4

who interviewed Hoffliine, who testified that they only spoke with Hoffliine very briefly,
that they did not ask him what he was doing before Powell picked him up, and that when
Hoffliine spoke with them for the approximate two minutes of their interview HoffHne
seemed calm, willing to talk, and as though he answered all of their questions to the best
of his knowledge (R. 408 at 39-40, 46).
The foregoing testimony confirms that the testimony of Mackenzie Carter was
consistent with the statements that Hoffliine made to the police.
While the State argues that the verdict demonstrates that the jury opted to view
Hoffliine's sequence of events as presented through Mackenzie Carter and the police as
incredible, State's Brief at 23 n.6, the better explanation for the verdict is that the jurors
were improperly influenced by the presentation of evidence that Boyadjieff had identified
Hoffliine as the robber and by the prosecutor's argument that Boyadjieff had identified
Hoffliine as the robber to within ninety to ninety-five percent certainty (R.407 at 222-23,
258; R. 408 at 162-64).
The State complains in footnote 5 of its brief that Hoffhine never explained '\vhy it was
error for the victim to testify that he was 95 per cent certain of the robber's identity at the showup, but throughout all subsequent proceedings, was consistently unsure whether defendant was
the robber." State's brief at 18 n.5.
To the extent that Hoflhine's opening brief does not explain the error, but see id. at 34,
37-38, perhaps the State's brief best sums it up when the State indicates that the trial court ruled
that "the show-up was unduly suggestive and constitutionally unreliable[.]" State's brief at 7.
5

While Hoffhine is not as certain as the State that this is what the trial court truly
ruled, see Opening Brief of Appellant at 19-21, the primary error he complains of on
appeal is that his conviction turned on this constitutionally unreliable evidence. See id.
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